Mythos Hardening Control · MRIS 2.0 · Applies to TISAX®

MHC-15 AI-resistant identity verification in personnel and access

Prevents a convincing deepfake identity or forged document from being accepted undetected in hiring or facility-access processes.

At a glance

Operational benefit: prevents a convincing deepfake identity or a forged document from being accepted without detection in the hiring or access process.
Policy affected: the personnel policy (hiring process), the access regulation.
Dependencies: no precondition; concerns HR and facility/site security jointly; implementable independently of MHC-14.
Effort drivers: a process change across two different specialist functions, possibly procuring liveness-detection tools.
Cost envelope (license/person-days, indicative order of magnitude without individual prices): SME — license low (a purely organizational second-channel obligation with no liveness tool), roughly 8–15 person-days · Midcap — license low to medium (targeted liveness-detection use for sensitive roles), roughly 15–35 person-days · Enterprise — license medium (liveness detection across several sites/high hiring volume), roughly 35–80 person-days.
Primary metric: share of security-relevant hiring/access cases with an additional, independently verified channel.
Standards touched (no claim of fulfilment): none of the six comparison frameworks from phase 3 applicable (original); TISAX® ISA 2027 2.1.1, 2.1.3, 3.1.1.

Control statement

For identity verification in the hiring process and at physical access points, verification does not rely exclusively on a single method conducted by video, telephone or a submitted document. For roles with access to protection-worthy information, at least one additional, independently verified channel is provided. Awareness measures on social engineering and phishing are extended to cover AI-generated, error-free and personalized attack patterns.

Purpose and threat relevance

Convincing forged identity documents and, in combination with video interviews, deepfake identities were until now regarded as specialist knowledge. AI-generated document forgery and real-time video/audio deepfakes make deceptively realistic identity pretence in the hiring process broadly accessible today — a known current pattern is fictitious remote employees. The same capability decoupling affects physical access: forged badges and convincing cover stories by telephone or at visitor registration. Classic awareness content trains recognition of spelling mistakes and impersonal salutations — features that AI-generated attacks no longer display. The protective objective is that a convincing but forged identity is not accepted on the basis of a single channel alone.

Effect across frameworks

These are the controls and requirements the MHC acts on. The classification shows how much each control loses its effect under AI-enabled attacks.

Effect across frameworks
Number	Title	Classification / Level
TISAX® ISA 2027 3 controls
2.1.1	Qualification of staff for sensitive work	partially degraded
2.1.3	Awareness and training	partially degraded
3.1.1	Security zones and physical access	partially degraded

All 45 controls in the findings matrix

Maturity path

Initial: additional verification channel piloted for the most sensitive roles/access points.
Defined: the process mandatory for all roles with access to protection-worthy information; awareness training updated.
Managed: liveness detection or technical document verification in production use; regular test cases for effectiveness checking.

Measurement and audit evidence

Metric: share of security-relevant hiring/access cases with a documented second verification channel (target: 100% for roles with access to protection-worthy information).
Evidence: updated policy texts, records of callback verifications carried out, training evidence on AI deception patterns.
Verification logic (following ISO/IEC 27001, Clause 9): documented? — the process description for both specialist functions; responsible? — human resources/site security; frequency? — for every security-relevant case; tolerance? — no security-relevant hire or access without a second channel, without a documented exception.
Evidence mapping to the ISA catalogue: for control 3.1.1 the ISA catalogue names as example evidence, among others, "Security zone concept and plan (site plan)"; "Key lists"; "Access logs of selected areas"; "Visitor Policy"; "Photos of the respective areas with recognizable security measures" (further examples in the source catalogue, not listed in full here). For 2.1.1 and 2.1.3 the catalogue provides no example; here the MHC evidence above carries the full weight on its own.

Typical mistakes

The second channel is provided for but is conducted via the same contact route provided by the applicant/visitor themselves — no genuine gain in independence.
Awareness training stops at classic phishing features, without addressing AI-generated deception.
The additional verification applies uniformly to all positions, so that the process is perceived as a burden and gradually circumvented.
Liveness-detection tools are procured but their results are not factored into the decision.

Delimitation and residual risk

Delimitation: concerns personnel hiring and physical access; verification of supplier evidence is governed by MHC-14.
Residual risk: liveness-detection tools are no guarantee against every future generation of deepfakes; the organizational second-channel obligation remains the more robust compensation.
TISAX® controls: 2.1.1, 2.1.3, 3.1.1 (see Part I).
Framework: original — no comparison framework from phase 3 addresses this scenario.

Implementation in detail

Organizational and technical implementation, implementation examples and the prioritization within the overall programme are described in the Implementation Guide.

Implementation Guide (PDF)Back to the MHC catalog