Analysis
ISO/IEC 27001 and TISAX® 2027
Analyzes every control individually against the threat model, classifies it into one of four categories and assigns the matching hardening measures to every gap.
Which security controls still hold against an AI attacker? ISO 27001, TISAX® and IT-Grundschutz put to the test
MRIS analyzes established standards control by control against attackers with the capabilities of a frontier AI model, names a hardening measure for every gap and shows in Implementation Guides how to put it in place. For ISO/IEC 27001 and TISAX®, and as user-defined modules for BSI IT-Grundschutz.
Select a cell to see the control, its classification and the hardening measure.
ISO/IEC 27001, Annex A
Read the analysis93 controls: 29 robust, 37 partially degraded, 4 friction-only, 23 not affected.
A.5
A.6
A.7
A.8
TISAX® 2027
Read the analysis45 controls: 4 robust, 26 partially degraded, 1 friction-only, 14 not affected. The classification applies to the normal case; some controls shift at high protection requirements.
Ch. 1
Ch. 2
Ch. 3
Ch. 4
Ch. 5
Ch. 6
Ch. 7
From analysis to implementation in the ISMS
Implementation Guide
ISO/IEC 27001 and TISAX® 2027
Describes every MHC in a fixed structure: organizational and technical implementation, examples, maturity path, measurement and audit evidence, and typical mistakes. A prioritization by Threat Priority Score orders the measures into a roadmap from P0 to P2.
IT-Grundschutz modules
BSI IT-Grundschutz, MRIS.bd 2.0
One process module and four system modules with 23 requirements implement MHC-01 to MHC-13 as user-defined modules under BSI Standard 200-2, with implementation guidance and a cross-reference table. No official BSI requirements; documents in German.
How MRIS analyzes
Established standards were written for human attackers. In their original form they do not specifically address AI-enabled attacks and have systematic gaps.
- 7
- systematic gaps in ISO/IEC 27002:2022 that other frameworks already close with binding requirements
- 8
- recurring finding patterns in TISAX® ISA 2027, most of them across several chapters
MRIS does not replace a framework. It takes an existing one and checks every single control for whether it still works when the attacker uses AI: faster, at scale and in many small, inconspicuous steps.
- Analyze. Every control of a standard is checked individually against the threat model.
- Classify. The result falls into one of four categories.
- Harden. Gaps are closed with measures from the MHC catalog. The MHC are derived from a gap analysis against more than 20 established frameworks, audit catalogs and reference works. Where none of them has an answer, such as deepfake checks in hiring or the integrity of multiple AI agents, MRIS adds measures of its own.
Which works the gap analysis draws on
- Regulation and audit catalogs
- BSI C5:2026, NIST CSF 2.0 and SP 800-53, DORA, CRA, NIS2 Directive with Implementing Regulation; for TISAX® additionally ISA/IEC 62443-2-1
- Complementary frameworks and standards
- BSI IT-Grundschutz, ISO/IEC 42001, CIS Controls, CSA Cloud Controls Matrix, CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model, NIST SP 800-207 and SP 800-218 (SSDF), OWASP ASVS and SAMM, SLSA, TIBER-EU
- AI and threat references
- Mythos-Ready (CSA, SANS, [un]prompted, OWASP), OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications and for LLM Applications, MITRE ATT&CK, ATLAS and D3FEND, NIST AI RMF
The four categories
- Robust
- Keeps working structurally: cryptographic or architectural hardness.
- Partially degraded
- Works with limitations and needs flanking hardening.
- Friction-only
- The classic implementation loses its standalone protective effect and must be replaced or redesigned.
- Not affected
- Neutral towards the AI threat and remains important unchanged.
The MHC catalog
Mythos Hardening Controls (MHC) are defined across standards. One measure closes gaps in every framework that references it and yields evidence for several audits at once. The numbers show how many controls or requirements an MHC acts on. In IT-Grundschutz, MHC-01 to MHC-13 are implemented as the user-defined module family MRIS.bd.
| MHC | Measure | ISO/IEC 27002 | TISAX® | IT-Grundschutz |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MHC-01 | 1 | – | 1 | |
Protects long-lived confidential data captured today from later decryption (“harvest now, decrypt later”) and, with the cryptographic inventory, lays the groundwork for an orderly migration to post-quantum algorithms. MHC-01 in detail: control statement, maturity path and audit evidence | ||||
| MHC-02 | 6 | – | 1 | |
Makes the origin and components of every piece of software verifiable – the basis for detecting AI-accelerated supply-chain attacks and tampered builds before they reach production. MHC-02 in detail: control statement, maturity path and audit evidence | ||||
| MHC-03 | 5 | 6 | 3 | |
Renders intercepted or real-time-relayed credentials worthless, removing the basis for automated, AI-scaled phishing. MHC-03 in detail: control statement, maturity path and audit evidence | ||||
| MHC-04 | 7 | – | 1 | |
Ties access to verified workload identities instead of network zones – reducing lateral movement once an AI attacker has initial access, and enabling the safe use of AI agents. ISO/IEC 27001 Annex AA.5.15, A.5.16, A.6.7, A.8.2, A.8.20, A.8.21, A.8.22 Open in the analysis matrixMHC-04 in detail: control statement, maturity path and audit evidence | ||||
| MHC-05 | 11 | 5 | 1 | |
Detects unknown, signature-less malware by its behavior as well as attacks deliberately split into many small, individually inconspicuous steps – in their sum rather than step by step. ISO/IEC 27001 Annex AA.5.3, A.5.7, A.5.14, A.5.15, A.8.1, A.8.3, A.8.4, A.8.7, A.8.12, A.8.15, A.8.16 Open in the analysis matrixMHC-05 in detail: control statement, maturity path and audit evidence | ||||
| MHC-06 | 2 | – | 1 | |
Hardens runtime environments through signed images and attestation – a compromised artifact does not reach production unnoticed, and data stays protected even during processing. MHC-06 in detail: control statement, maturity path and audit evidence | ||||
| MHC-07 | 2 | – | 1 | |
Enforces demonstrable separation between tenants – a compromised tenant does not become a springboard to others; effectiveness is proven by separation tests, not merely asserted. MHC-07 in detail: control statement, maturity path and audit evidence | ||||
| MHC-08 | 5 | 1 | 3 | |
Ensures backups remain restorable even with compromised admin rights, and that recovery actually works in an emergency instead of existing only on paper. MHC-08 in detail: control statement, maturity path and audit evidence | ||||
| MHC-09 | 6 | 3 | 1 | |
Shortens the time between a known vulnerability and its remediation to a pace that keeps up with AI-accelerated exploit development. MHC-09 in detail: control statement, maturity path and audit evidence | ||||
| MHC-10 | 4 | 12 | 1 | |
Closes the window between two periodic review cycles in which new attack patterns, incidents or system changes would otherwise remain undetected until the next round. TISAX® 20271.1.1, 1.2.1, 1.3.1, 1.3.3, 1.3.4, 1.5.1, 1.6.3, 4.1.3, 4.2.1, 5.2.9, 6.1.2, 6.1.3 Open in the findings matrixMHC-10 in detail: control statement, maturity path and audit evidence | ||||
| MHC-11 | 4 | 1 | 1 | |
Shortens the response time to a security-relevant event to a level that no longer depends on human processing speed alone. MHC-11 in detail: control statement, maturity path and audit evidence | ||||
| MHC-12 | 2 | – | 1 | |
Validates the entire defense chain against realistic, AI-driven attack scenarios – revealing whether detection and response work in practice rather than only on paper. MHC-12 in detail: control statement, maturity path and audit evidence | ||||
| MHC-13 | 3 | 2 | 6 | |
Prevents an AI-powered assistant from independently pulling in an unvetted external tool, service or software package while working on a task, and additionally constrains the identity, prompt-injection exposure and response time of agents in production. IT-Grundschutz, MRIS.bdbd.1.A6, bd.2.4.A1, bd.2.4.A2, bd.2.4.A3, bd.2.4.A4, bd.2.4.A5 View the requirementsMHC-13 in detail: control statement, maturity path and audit evidence | ||||
| MHC-14 | – | 2 | – | |
Prevents an AI-assisted, convincingly forged or embellished supplier attestation from being accepted as sufficient without detection. MHC-14 in detail: control statement, maturity path and audit evidence | ||||
| MHC-15 | – | 3 | – | |
Prevents a convincing deepfake identity or forged document from being accepted undetected in hiring or facility-access processes. MHC-15 in detail: control statement, maturity path and audit evidence | ||||
| MHC-16 | – | added | – | |
Limits how far a manipulated, faulty or compromised agent can act within a chain or orchestration of multiple AI agents before damage occurs or spreads. TISAX® 2027Original addition without a TISAX® finding – see the Implementation Guide (Part II). MHC-16 in detail: control statement, maturity path and audit evidence | ||||
Catalog status: 16 MHC, September 2026. MHC-16 is an original addition beyond the TISAX® diagnosis.
Publications
All editions are free and available without registration. The machine-readable editions can be imported into ISMS tools.
| Publication | Edition | Date | License | Files |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ISO/IEC 27001, Annex A | ||||
| MRIS analysis | 2.0 | September 2026 | CC BY-SA 4.0 | DEEN |
| Implementation Guide | 2.0 | September 2026 | CC BY-SA 4.0 | DEEN |
| Machine-readable edition | 2.0 | September 2026 | CC BY-SA 4.0 | YAML |
| TISAX® ISA 2027, Information Security | ||||
| Analysis, Part I | 2.0 | September 2026 | CC BY-NC 4.0 | DEEN |
| Implementation Guide | 2.0 | September 2026 | CC BY-NC 4.0 | DEEN |
| BSI IT-Grundschutz, MRIS.bd (user-defined, German only) | ||||
| Complete package: 5 modules, implementation guidance, cross-reference table, YAML, change log | 2.0 | September 2026 | CC BY-SA 4.0 | ZIP |
| Machine-readable edition | 2.0 | September 2026 | CC BY-SA 4.0 | YAML |
| Change log 1.3 to 2.0 | 2.0 | 20 September 2026 | – | |
Licenses: CC BY-SA 4.0 for MRIS for ISO/IEC 27001 and the IT-Grundschutz modules, CC BY-NC 4.0 for MRIS for TISAX®. © 2026 Richard Peddi.
Usage note
The MRIS publications are working aids for analyzing the effectiveness of existing security controls. They assume an established ISMS and do not replace it. They do not constitute legal, compliance or certification advice, make no claim to completeness and establish no warranty. Use is at your own responsibility.
TISAX® independence notice
TISAX® is a registered trademark of the ENX Association; the ENX Association administers TISAX® on behalf of the German Association of the Automotive Industry (VDA), which develops and publishes the underlying requirements catalog (VDA ISA). MRIS is an independent, privately produced work with no affiliation to the ENX Association or the VDA. It is neither part of the official TISAX® assessment process nor authorized, reviewed or endorsed by ENX, and does not replace a TISAX® maturity assessment by an accredited audit provider.
IT-Grundschutz independence notice
MRIS.bd is a family of user-defined modules within the meaning of the IT-Grundschutz methodology (BSI Standard 200-2). The modules contain no official BSI requirements, have been neither reviewed nor approved by the BSI, are not part of the IT-Grundschutz Compendium and do not replace any certification. MRIS is an independent project and not an offering of the BSI.
About MRIS
MRIS is an independent project by Richard Peddi.
Richard Peddi is a certified IT specialist for systems integration (Fachinformatiker) and a Certified IT Business Manager (Operative Professional), and holds an M.Sc. in Information Security Management. Among other qualifications he is an ISO/IEC 27001 Lead Auditor. He has worked as a security consultant in the critical infrastructure (KRITIS) sector and as a CISO before taking up his current role as Group CISO.
MRIS is produced independently of his professional employment. Questions about the method, reports of errors and consulting inquiries are welcome.