# MRIS.bd.1 - machine-readable edition (EN)
# Generated from the document masters; the DOCX editions v1.2 are authoritative
meta:
  id: MRIS.bd.1
  title: "Mythos-Resistant Hardening of the ISMS"
  type: process module
  application: "once to the entire information domain"
  version: "1.2"
  date: 2026-08-14
  language: en
  author: "Richard Peddi"
  license: "CC BY-NC 4.0"
  license_addendum: "Use within IT security concepts based on IT-Grundschutz is expressly permitted"
  documents:
    module: MRIS_bd_1_Module_v1_2_EN.docx
    implementation_guidance: MRIS_bd_1_Implementation_Guidance_v1_2_EN.docx
    cross_reference_table: MRIS_bd_1_Cross_Reference_Table_v1_2_EN.xlsx
  sources:
    - key: MRIS
      title: "Mythos-Resistant Information Security (MRIS) - Framework"
      version: "1.9 (German edition)"
      license: "CC BY-SA 4.0"
    - key: MRISIG
      title: "MRIS Implementation Guide"
      version: "1.5 (German edition)"
      license: "CC BY-SA 4.0"
roles:
  overall_responsibility: "Chief Information Security Officer (CISO)"
  further: [IT Operation Department, Developer]
threats:
  - id: G1
    title: "Collapse of the Window Between Patch and Exploit"
  - id: G2
    title: "Compression of the Response Timeline"
  - id: G3
    title: "Fragmentation of Attacks into Inconspicuous Micro-Steps"
  - id: G4
    title: "Decoupling of Attacker Capability and Actor Type"
  - id: G5
    title: "Unregulated Use of Privileged AI Agents"
requirements:
  - id: MRIS.bd.1.A1
    title: "Reassessing the Effectiveness Assumptions of Existing Security Safeguards"
    level: B
    role: "CISO"
    mhc: null
    mris_reference: "MRIS chapter 10.2"
    iso_27002_anchors: ["Annex A (entire)"]
    threat_reference: [G1, G2, G3, G4, G5]
    elementary_threats: ["G 0.18"]
    sub_requirements:
      - "The organisation MUST reassess the effectiveness and probability assumptions of the implemented security safeguards against the AI-accelerated threat landscape."
      - "Security safeguards whose protective effect relies predominantly on attacker friction rather than on a hard structural barrier MUST be identified in the process."
      - "The results of the reassessment MUST be incorporated into the risk analysis."
      - "If the protective effect of a safeguard is assessed as degraded, then a decision MUST be taken between hardening, compensation, and justified risk acceptance."
      - "The reassessment MUST be repeated upon significant changes to the threat landscape."
  - id: MRIS.bd.1.A2
    title: "Using Phishing-Resistant Multi-Factor Authentication"
    level: B
    role: "CISO"
    mhc: MHC-03
    iso_27002_anchors: ["A.5.17", "A.8.5"]
    threat_reference: [G4]
    elementary_threats: ["G 0.23", "G 0.36", "G 0.42"]
    sub_requirements:
      - "All privileged access MUST be protected with phishing-resistant mechanisms based on FIDO2/WebAuthn (passkeys or hardware tokens)."
      - "All externally reachable services MUST be protected with phishing-resistant mechanisms."
      - "Access to systems with increased protection needs MUST be protected with phishing-resistant mechanisms."
      - "SMS-based mechanisms and simple push confirmations without number matching MUST NOT be used for new access."
      - "For existing legacy MFA mechanisms, a phase-out plan with a deadline MUST be documented."
      - "The enrolment and recovery processes for authentication means MUST be protected against social engineering."
  - id: MRIS.bd.1.A3
    title: "Maintaining Immutable Backups with Regular Restore Tests"
    level: B
    role: "IT Operation Department"
    mhc: MHC-08
    iso_27002_anchors: ["A.8.13"]
    threat_reference: [G2, G4]
    elementary_threats: ["G 0.39", "G 0.45", "G 0.46"]
    sub_requirements:
      - "For all business-critical data sets, at least one immutable or air-gapped backup copy MUST be maintained."
      - "The backup regime SHOULD be built according to the 3-2-1-1-0 principle."
      - "The backup infrastructure MUST be administered via dedicated access paths and privileges separated from the production environment."
      - "Restore tests MUST be performed at least quarterly."
      - "The restore tests MUST be documented."
      - "If a restore test fails, then the cause MUST be remediated without delay."
  - id: MRIS.bd.1.A4
    title: "Establishing Behaviour-Based Attack Detection with Event Correlation"
    level: B
    role: "CISO"
    mhc: MHC-05
    iso_27002_anchors: ["A.8.16", "A.8.12"]
    threat_reference: [G2, G3]
    elementary_threats: ["G 0.23", "G 0.32", "G 0.39"]
    sub_requirements:
      - "The organisation MUST have procedures in place for detecting attacks based on behavioural anomalies and the correlation of related events."
      - "The detection rules MUST be aligned with a recognised catalogue of attack techniques (MITRE ATT&CK)."
      - "The coverage of the most relevant attack techniques MUST be measured."
      - "The measured coverage MUST be reviewed regularly."
      - "Threat hunting SHOULD be established as a permanent function with a documented methodology."
      - "If no in-house security operations centre is operated, then a managed detection and response service with a comparable scope of services SHOULD be commissioned."
  - id: MRIS.bd.1.A5
    title: "Introducing Workload Identities and Identity-Based Access Control"
    level: B
    role: "IT Operation Department"
    mhc: MHC-04
    iso_27002_anchors: ["A.5.16", "A.8.20", "A.8.21"]
    threat_reference: [G3, G5]
    elementary_threats: ["G 0.23", "G 0.30", "G 0.32", "G 0.36"]
    sub_requirements:
      - "Privileged service accounts and workloads MUST be equipped with cryptographically verifiable, short-lived identities."
      - "Communication between critical services MUST be authorised on the basis of this workload identity."
      - "Network location alone MUST NOT serve as the basis for authorisation."
      - "Long-lived shared secrets stored in plain text MUST NOT be used on critical communication paths."
      - "Communication between production services SHOULD be protected end-to-end with mTLS."
      - "The migration SHOULD proceed in stages, starting with the privileged workloads."
  - id: MRIS.bd.1.A6
    title: "Creating a Cryptographic Inventory and a Post-Quantum Migration Strategy"
    level: B
    role: "CISO"
    mhc: MHC-01
    iso_27002_anchors: ["A.8.24"]
    threat_reference: [G4]
    elementary_threats: ["G 0.14", "G 0.15", "G 0.19"]
    sub_requirements:
      - "The organisation MUST maintain an inventory of all cryptographic mechanisms, key lengths, and implementations in use."
      - "If data with a long confidentiality lifetime is processed, then a documented migration strategy towards quantum-safe mechanisms MUST be in place."
      - "If data with a long confidentiality lifetime is transmitted, then hybrid mechanisms SHOULD be used during the transition."
      - "The inventory and the strategy MUST be reviewed at least annually or on an event-driven basis."
      - "For new procurements, support for quantum-safe or replaceable mechanisms SHOULD be included as a requirement."
  - id: MRIS.bd.1.A7
    title: "Regulated Use of AI Agents"
    level: B
    role: "CISO"
    mhc: MHC-13
    iso_27002_anchors: ["A.5.9", "A.5.16", "A.8.27"]
    threat_reference: [G5]
    elementary_threats: ["G 0.20", "G 0.21", "G 0.30", "G 0.32", "G 0.37"]
    sub_requirements:
      - "The organisation MUST maintain an inventory of all AI agents and agentic components used in production."
      - "If AI agents are used in production, then they MUST be treated as privileged systems."
      - "Every production AI agent MUST be given a technical identity limited to the privileges required."
      - "Actions of AI agents with write or network privileges MUST be logged completely and attributably to the initiating human identity."
      - "For every production AI agent, a named responsible person with the ability to shut it down MUST be designated."
      - "Irreversible actions of an AI agent MUST require human approval."
      - "Agentic components such as MCP servers, IDE extensions, and skills MUST ONLY be used via a maintained allow list."
  - id: MRIS.bd.1.A8
    title: "Generating Software Bills of Materials and Build Provenance Evidence"
    level: S
    role: "Developer"
    mhc: MHC-02
    iso_27002_anchors: ["A.5.21", "A.8.30"]
    threat_reference: [G1]
    elementary_threats: ["G 0.20", "G 0.21", "G 0.28"]
    sub_requirements:
      - "For every piece of software created and distributed by the organisation, a software bill of materials (SBOM) in a standardised format SHOULD be generated automatically in the build pipeline."
      - "The SBOM SHOULD also capture transitive dependencies."
      - "The captured components SHOULD be correlated automatically against vulnerability databases."
      - "If a new vulnerability becomes known, then the organisation’s own exposure MUST be determinable within 24 hours on the basis of the SBOMs."
      - "For critical artefacts, tamper-proof build provenance SHOULD be maintained."
      - "The provision of an SBOM SHOULD be contractually required from critical software suppliers."
  - id: MRIS.bd.1.A9
    title: "Integrating Automated Security Testing into the Development Pipeline"
    level: S
    role: "Developer"
    mhc: MHC-09
    iso_27002_anchors: ["A.8.29", "A.8.25"]
    threat_reference: [G1]
    elementary_threats: ["G 0.21", "G 0.28"]
    sub_requirements:
      - "Security testing of the source code, the dependencies, and the running application SHOULD be executed automatically in the development pipeline on every change."
      - "Severe findings SHOULD block the merge into the main branch."
      - "AI-generated code SHOULD be additionally tested as a distinct risk category."
      - "If an actively exploited vulnerability in a deployed component becomes known, then the patch for internet-exposed systems SHOULD be rolled out within 24 hours."
  - id: MRIS.bd.1.A10
    title: "Automating Incident Response with Hardened Playbooks"
    level: S
    role: "CISO"
    mhc: MHC-11
    iso_27002_anchors: ["A.5.24", "A.5.25", "A.5.26"]
    threat_reference: [G2]
    elementary_threats: ["G 0.23", "G 0.39", "G 0.40"]
    sub_requirements:
      - "For unambiguous incident types, predefined automated response playbooks SHOULD be in place."
      - "The containment of unambiguous incidents SHOULD be initiated automatically within minutes."
      - "Ambiguous or severe cases SHOULD be escalated in a targeted manner to the persons responsible for them."
      - "If an automatic action can cause major damage, then human approval MUST be obtained before execution."
      - "The automation layer itself SHOULD be hardened, in particular through authenticated triggers, a complete audit trail, and rate limits."
      - "Exercises for multiple parallel incidents SHOULD be conducted at least every six months."
      - "If no in-house security team exists, then a managed detection and response service with a contractually agreed containment time MAY be used."
  - id: MRIS.bd.1.A11
    title: "Establishing Continuous Automated Effectiveness Verification"
    level: S
    role: "CISO"
    mhc: MHC-10
    iso_27002_anchors: ["A.5.35", "A.5.36"]
    threat_reference: [G2]
    elementary_threats: ["G 0.18", "G 0.29", "G 0.31"]
    sub_requirements:
      - "Compliance with the security safeguards listed in the Statement of Applicability SHOULD be verified continuously and automatically against defined target states."
      - "Security requirements SHOULD, where possible, be formulated as executable rules (policy as code)."
      - "These rules SHOULD be integrated into the deployment and operations processes."
      - "Deviations SHOULD automatically trigger a defined response."
      - "The share of security safeguards verified automatically SHOULD be measured."
      - "This share SHOULD be increased step by step."
  - id: MRIS.bd.1.A12
    title: "Using Signed Container Images and Protected Execution Environments"
    level: H
    role: "IT Operation Department"
    mhc: MHC-06
    iso_27002_anchors: ["A.5.23", "A.8.31"]
    threat_reference: [G4]
    elementary_threats: ["G 0.14", "G 0.20", "G 0.21"]
    sub_requirements:
      - "Production containers SHOULD be started exclusively from signed images from controlled registries that are verified before start-up."
      - "Verification SHOULD be enforced technically by the platform, for example with admission controller policies."
      - "If workloads have particularly high protection needs, then protected execution environments (confidential computing) with remote attestation SHOULD be used."
  - id: MRIS.bd.1.A13
    title: "Implementing Verifiable Tenant Separation"
    level: H
    role: "IT Operation Department"
    mhc: MHC-07
    iso_27002_anchors: ["A.5.23", "A.8.22"]
    threat_reference: [G4]
    elementary_threats: ["G 0.14", "G 0.19", "G 0.23"]
    sub_requirements:
      - "If multi-tenant services are operated, then data, networks, and compute resources MUST be separated per tenant."
      - "Data separation SHOULD be implemented with tenant-specific keys."
      - "The effectiveness of the separation SHOULD be demonstrated through regular, preferably automated tests."
      - "If cross-tenant access is detected, then it MUST be stopped without delay."
  - id: MRIS.bd.1.A14
    title: "Conducting Threat-Led Penetration Tests with AI Scenarios"
    level: H
    role: "CISO"
    mhc: MHC-12
    iso_27002_anchors: ["A.5.35", "A.8.29"]
    threat_reference: [G1, G2, G3, G4]
    elementary_threats: ["G 0.18", "G 0.23", "G 0.28", "G 0.42"]
    sub_requirements:
      - "The effectiveness of the protective safeguards SHOULD be verified regularly through threat-led penetration testing."
      - "The test scenarios SHOULD include AI-typical attack approaches, in particular fragmented attack chains, parallel multi-vector attacks, and AI-assisted spear phishing."
      - "Between the test cycles, joint exercises of the offensive and defensive sides (purple teaming) SHOULD take place."
      - "Critical findings SHOULD be remediated within an agreed time frame."
safeguards:
  - id: MRIS.bd.1.M1
    corresponds_to: MRIS.bd.1.A1
    key_figure: "Share of reassessed Annex A safeguards (target 100 %)"
  - id: MRIS.bd.1.M2
    corresponds_to: MRIS.bd.1.A2
    key_figure: "Share of sign-ins via phishing-resistant mechanisms per access class"
  - id: MRIS.bd.1.M3
    corresponds_to: MRIS.bd.1.A3
    key_figure: "Success rate of quarterly restore tests (target 100 %)"
  - id: MRIS.bd.1.M4
    corresponds_to: MRIS.bd.1.A4
    key_figure: "ATT&CK coverage of the most relevant techniques (guideline >= 60 % top 10)"
  - id: MRIS.bd.1.M5
    corresponds_to: MRIS.bd.1.A5
    key_figure: "Share of production service-to-service connections with workload identity and mTLS"
  - id: MRIS.bd.1.M6
    corresponds_to: MRIS.bd.1.A6
    key_figure: "Share of mechanisms captured and prioritised in the crypto inventory"
  - id: MRIS.bd.1.M7
    corresponds_to: MRIS.bd.1.A7
    key_figure: "Share of production agents with threat model; logging coverage (each 100 %)"
  - id: MRIS.bd.1.M8
    corresponds_to: MRIS.bd.1.A8
    key_figure: "SBOM coverage of shipped artefacts"
  - id: MRIS.bd.1.M9
    corresponds_to: MRIS.bd.1.A9
    key_figure: "Time from KEV disclosure to patch roll-out (guideline < 24 h)"
  - id: MRIS.bd.1.M10
    corresponds_to: MRIS.bd.1.A10
    key_figure: "Mean time to containment (guideline < 10 min at high unambiguity)"
  - id: MRIS.bd.1.M11
    corresponds_to: MRIS.bd.1.A11
    key_figure: "Continuous monitoring coverage (>= 60 % after 12, >= 80 % after 24 months)"
  - id: MRIS.bd.1.M12
    corresponds_to: MRIS.bd.1.A12
    key_figure: "Share of production containers from signed, verified images (target 100 %)"
  - id: MRIS.bd.1.M13
    corresponds_to: MRIS.bd.1.A13
    key_figure: "Outcome of tenant separation tests (no cross-tenant access)"
  - id: MRIS.bd.1.M14
    corresponds_to: MRIS.bd.1.A14
    key_figure: "Closure rate of remediated findings within the time frame (guideline >= 90 %)"
