Mythos Hardening Control · MRIS 2.0 · Applies to ISO/IEC 27001 and IT-Grundschutz
MHC-02 SBOM and build provenance
Makes the origin and components of every piece of software verifiable – the basis for detecting AI-accelerated supply-chain attacks and tampered builds before they reach production.
At a glance
- Operational benefit
- makes immediately visible which third-party components are contained in the organization's own software, so that when a new vulnerability appears it is clear in minutes rather than days whether and where the organization is affected. Precondition: SBOM generation and vulnerability correlation at least at the Defined level.
- Policy affected
- policy on secure software development and supplier management.
- Dependencies
- no precondition; presupposes an automated build and CI pipeline to realize the full benefit.
- Effort drivers
- depends on the number and structure of the build pipelines and the depth of the supply chain. The actual effort depends on the organization's resources.
- Primary metric
- share of delivered artefacts with a current, automatically generated bill of materials (SBOM coverage).
- Standards touched (no claim of fulfilment)
- ISO/IEC 27002 A.5.21/A.8.30 primarily, supplemented by A.5.19, A.5.20, A.5.22 (supplier and service management) and A.8.4 (access to source code); for the complete mapping see MRIS Annex A. CRA Annex I; BSI TR-03183-2; C5:2026 DEV-13; SLSA.
Control statement
For every piece of software developed in-house and distributed onwards, a bill of materials of the contained components (SBOM) is generated automatically and reconciled against vulnerability databases. Advanced hardening (Managed level): for critical artefacts it is additionally documented in a traceable way how and from what they were built (build provenance), and the provenance attestations are verified in automated form.
Purpose and threat relevance
Modern software consists to a large extent of third-party building blocks (open source libraries, frameworks). If a vulnerability becomes known in one of those blocks — or an attacker deliberately smuggles malicious code into the supply chain — it is often unclear for days, without an overview, whether and where the organization is affected. AI drastically shortens the time between a vulnerability becoming known and a working attack. A current bill of materials makes the organization's own exposure immediately verifiable; evidence of origin and build method makes it harder to substitute manipulated building blocks unnoticed. The protective objective is to detect and contain attacks through the software supply chain quickly.
Effect across frameworks
These are the controls and requirements the MHC acts on. The classification shows how much each control loses its effect under AI-enabled attacks.
| Number | Title | Classification / Level |
|---|---|---|
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022, Annex A 6 controls | ||
| A.5.19 | Information security in supplier relationships | partially degraded |
| A.5.20 | Addressing information security within supplier agreements | partially degraded |
| A.5.21 | Managing information security in the ICT supply chain | partially degraded |
| A.5.22 | Monitoring, review and change management of supplier services | partially degraded |
| A.8.4 | Access to source code | partially degraded |
| A.8.30 | Outsourced development | partially degraded |
| IT-Grundschutz, MRIS.bd 1 requirements | ||
| MRIS.bd.1.A7 | Generating SBOMs and Build Provenance Evidence | Standard |
All 93 controls in the analysis matrix · All 23 requirements of the module family
Maturity path
- Initial
- SBOM generation in individual pipelines.
- Defined
- SBOM for all of the organization's own artefacts; automated vulnerability reconciliation.
- Managed
- SBOM from critical suppliers as well; build provenance (SLSA) for critical artefacts; automated verification of the provenance attestations.
Measurement and audit evidence
- Metric
- SBOM coverage — share of delivered artefacts with a current, automatically generated bill of materials (target: complete coverage of the organization's own artefacts).
- Evidence
- SBOM files per version, pipeline configuration, vulnerability reconciliation reports, provenance attestations for critical artefacts.
- Evidence logic (following ISO/IEC 27001, Clause 9)
- documented? — pipeline configuration and bills of materials; responsible? — development and product owners; frequency? — with every build, reconciliation on an ongoing basis; tolerance? — no delivered artefact without a current bill of materials.
Typical mistakes
- Bills of materials are generated but never evaluated — in a vulnerability event an SBOM exists, but nobody reconciles it.
- Only the top-level dependencies are recorded; precisely the deeply nested building blocks in which vulnerabilities reside are missing.
- The SBOM is produced once and not updated per version, so that it does not match the state actually delivered.
- Vulnerability data are mixed into the SBOM; that conflates the static bill of materials with dynamic information and quickly renders it unusable.
Delimitation and residual risk
- Delimitation
- concerns transparency and provenance of the software building blocks; actually closing the vulnerabilities is part of vulnerability and patch management, and automated testing is dealt with by MHC-09.
- Residual risk
- a bill of materials detects known but not unknown vulnerabilities; correctly declared but manipulated components are not exposed by the SBOM alone — provenance serves that purpose.
- ISO/IEC 27002:2022
- A.5.19 Information security in supplier relationships; A.5.20 Addressing information security within supplier agreements; A.5.21 Managing information security in the ICT supply chain; A.8.4 Access to source code; A.8.30 Outsourced development.
- Framework
- C5:2026 DEV-13; CRA Annex I (SBOM obligation for manufacturers of products with digital elements; vulnerability notification obligations from 2026, main obligations for products placed on the market after 11 December 2027); BSI TR-03183-2; DORA Art. 28; NIS2 IR No. 5; SLSA framework; formats CycloneDX (ECMA-424) and SPDX (ISO/IEC 5962).
Implementation in detail
Organizational and technical implementation, implementation examples and the prioritization within the overall programme are described in the Implementation Guide.
Implementation Guide (PDF)Back to the MHC catalog
Source: MRIS Implementation Guide (ISO/IEC 27001), edition 2.0. License CC BY-SA 4.0. © 2026 Richard Peddi.